Saxe moralised on the predicament that arose from the blindness of the wise men who went to "see" the elephant, as a metaphor within the context of "theologic wars". In that context, it is indeed most appropriate, since the denizens asserted to the realms of theology are certainly not commonly visible to most - a fact which curiously does not appear to dampen the vociferousness with which their natures and wants are proclaimed to be known by those with so-called privileged access. Yet the context may easily be extended to just about any sphere of human inquiry and activity, as we well note that hair-splitting disputes endlessly arise in all domains as a consequence of the different possible ways of viewing things, much like the blind sages who attained their various perspectives as they happened to chance upon different parts of the elephant's anatomy. Over the vast range of human inquiry, far more beliefs and attitudes hold sway than those that would form a consistent whole and far too many are tenaciously held yet undaunted by lack of adequate substantiation and rational justification. Cacophony rules from end to end with a mere few islands of relative serenity and reason. It is by no means a harmonious picture! And this is well beyond the healthy give-and-take of rational dialogue; blind intransigence is, by far, the rule rather than the exception. That there is a pressing need to resolve the dilemma posed by Saxe is in little doubt.
How then would it be possible to rise above this, often deplorable, state of affairs? It was noted earlier that merely granting sight to the blind men may still not provide the relief sought if that sight is, notwithstanding, used from a narrow distinct perspective in a hasty manner. The reader of the poem is provided a privileged vantage point from which it is easily seen, at least by one somewhat familiar with the appearance of an elephant, that the blind men misconstrue the real nature of the elephant due to not only their lack of vision, which could reveal more of the beast, but to their forming an opinion based on a single encounter and no more. That single encounter is a metaphor for an impoverished vantage point. The blatantly obvious opposite of an impoverished vantage point is a rich one, that is, one that is as broad and inclusive as is possible to achieve. Even without being granted sight, the blind men could have achieved the necessary breadth of vantage point by simply continuing to grope and prod the elephant, assuming it was in a co-operative mood, until they had satisfied themselves that nothing new remained to be found. From such a broader, richer, comprehensive vantage point, each blind man would have had a far truer conception of the elephant with perhaps only trivial points of disagreement among themselves.
This simple expedient may not so easily be applied to the general sphere of human inquiry. Whereas the elephant has but a few body parts accessible to the sense of touch and is limited in extent, the landscape of human inquiry is vast in detail and has so far not shown any sign of even a very remote boundary. The difference in comparative scale is mind-boggling - literally. It boggles the mind even as to where to start and how to proceed in gaining a broad enough perspective on the general scope of human inquiry. The exponential growth in the quantity and scope of knowledge is enough to make one despair and give up before an attempt is even made. How could any mortal possibly get to know enough of this to claim a properly broad and balanced vantage point? The best that even the most cognitively gifted appear to achieve is to stake out some tiny patch of specialisation wherein they wrest a few more scraps of knowledge away from mystery, to add to our accumulating, ponderous heap. This however is the exact recipe for the narrow viewpoint of the wise men who Saxe appropriately described as "To learning much inclined". We take note of what normally happens in the process of formal education. Although ideally, the goal of formal education is also the attainment of a broad and balanced viewpoint, the approach at its outset is just the opposite; mostly details and particulars are taught at the start and perhaps only later are these details shown to be subsumed under broad universals ; this approach is unavoidable because, as formal education begins, the students are too young and not cognitively mature enough to grasp the universal concepts and their relation to particulars. By the time the broad universals start to be taken up, the opposite trend of entering a specialisation takes precedence and nips in the bud the fuller understanding of universals and their significance to general understanding. On this path, a specialist certainly gains depth of knowledge but at the sacrifice of breadth. Hence, even the "wise" end up in a deep yet narrow well. In the normal human lifespan, there is no time to attain such specialisation in many areas, as the term "specialisation" itself attests. This surely is not the path to the broad vantage point being sought.
We are looking for breadth of knowledge as that which offers the preferred comprehensive vantage point. One could possibly sample a large number of domains, unavoidably in a shallow manner. But which ones and how deep to go? Are all domains needed? And we don't have the luxury of infinite stretches of time. In addition, we need to heed the warning of Alexander Pope regarding the foolish headiness often arising from a shallow sampling of knowledge:
"A
little learning is a dangerous thing;
Drink deep, or taste not the
Pierian spring:
There shallow draughts intoxicate the brain,
And
drinking largely sobers us again."
Neither depth nor breadth in the domains of knowledge appear to offer the hoped for vantage point. But this may be a false dichotomy for just this simple reason. The dichotomy rests on the assumption that all knowledge along either of the dimensions of breadth or depth is of equal value and scope. By good fortune, this is not the case. In fact, the type of knowledge that offers the greatest value toward a broad vantage point is relatively compact and only occasionally suffers significant upheaval on account of the relentless accumulation of new details. This class of knowledge is thus among the firmest and most stable. In consequence, it is the most suitable upon which to build a solid, reliable comprehensive vantage point. Herber Spencer offers the clue in his work, First Principles.
"The truths of Philosophy thus bear the same relation to the highest scientific truths, that each of these bears to lower scientific truths. As each widest generalization of Science comprehends and consolidates the narrower generalizations of its own division; so the generalizations of Philosophy comprehend and consolidate the widest generalizations of Science. It is therefore a knowledge the extreme opposite in kind to that which experience first accumulates. It is the final product of that process which begins with a mere colligation of crude observations, goes on establishing propositions that are broader and more separated from particular cases, and ends in universal propositions. Or to bring the definition to its simplest and clearest form: -- Knowledge of the lowest kind is un-unified knowledge; Science is partially-unified knowledge; Philosophy is completely-unified knowledge."
Spencer offers philosophy as the domain providing the broadest universals, which he metaphorically places as the highest truths, with the countless details subsumed under these universals depicted as the lowest. And he concurs that the process begins at the bottom with disjoint details. His metaphor of height represents the value of these truths with respect to generality (breadth) and degree of unification. To turn this metaphor upside-down, all detailed knowledge is supported by a foundation of truths of the most general, unified, and comprehensive nature. In this latter depiction, these foundational truths are relatively few in number compared to the overall cardinality of the whole domain of knowledge; each, being very broad, supports a vast number of details related to it. Being at the foundations of knowledge provides the assurance that these truths are not as ephemeral and open to revision as the supported details may be. We have our stability.
There is no need to look only to philosophy for these truths, as Spencer seems to imply at first glance. He is in fact, more generally, talking of first principles, many of which have been in the purview of philosophy historically but, by modern standards, not exclusively. In any case, this view of the structure of knowledge happily coincides with our earlier goal to glean the most comprehensive, consistent, and cohesive, knowledge, or truths if you will, that may be comprehended within our finite cognitive and temporal limits, in order to gain the broadest vantage point possible. That is, the purpose of the exploration that is to be undertaken here, is to plumb all domains of knowledge to gather together a comprehensive body of first principles which are as broadly applicable as possible. The standards by which this will proceed are this:comprehensive, to provide the essential breadth; consistent, so that no paradoxes or contradictions arise; and cohesive, so that all fit together in an integrated whole to the extent that this is possible given our inherent limitations.
Is there some way to gauge if this is an achievable quest? Can we find some support or encouragement, or is this just tilting at windmills? Albert Einstein voiced some words of encouragement. He claimed,
"It should be possible to explain the laws of physics to a barmaid."
If one takes the laws of physics to be its basic principles - a reasonable view - Einstein's optimism expresses that these principles should be simple enough and few enough in number to be accessible to most in a reasonable amount of time. What is more, the laws of physics are at the basis of the known physical universe, a very comprehensive domain indeed! In addition, his view that,
"Everything should be made as simple as possible, but not simpler."
holds that unnecessary complexity purchases no benefit. We are more likely to find that first principles are simple since they are at the core of yet more complex structures. As the complexity of particulars is pared away, the simple foundational principles remain.
We also find some encouragement from the area of literature that a comprehensive, general approach has advantages. In the category of science-fiction we find a classic in The Voyage of the Space Beagle by A.E. Van Vogt. The hero of this tale is a "Nexialist" who is a generalist of a broad range of disciplines and outshines specialists in resolving a series of predicaments where the specialists fail to see solutions, blinded by their narrow vantage points reminiscent of Saxe's blind sages. The Nobel Laureate Herman Hesse also created a work of fiction called The Glass Bead Game about an order of intellectuals who pursue lifelong mastery of a game which integrates a very broad array of disciplines. Of course, situations in fiction are contrived to suit the purposes of the author and cannot strictly be taken as supporting evidence of anything in particular. But it is nevertheless intriguing that some authors have seen feasible potential in such a comprehensive approach.
Bolstered by this brief reflection on feasibility, the question then arises as to where to start and how to proceed with the quest of building a generalised, comprehensive, consistent, and cohesive vantage point, that is, world view, built upon broad first principles. For it is a comprehensive world view that this is about. The principles are about the fundamental nature of the world, or universe, which is, by definition as comprehensive as it gets. And they provide a conceptual view, or perspective on this world from which all may be seen. The proposal here is to explore the following general domains of knowledge whose conjoined first principles should meet the required earlier standards of being comprehensive, consistent, and cohesive, for the reasons to follow:
Some may note that I have left out what is of great significance to many, that is, the spiritual and supernatural. In my view, these are not left out at all but belong under the domain of psychology as manifestations of the mind. In my view, if they were taken to be separate and distinct from all the above domains, the whole will certainly be still comprehensive but would fail catastrophically to be consistent and cohesive. This is patently clear, for there would be no rational way to close the floodgates on the whole farrago of trolls, leprechauns, imps, banshees, vampires, phantoms and so on and so forth, in addition to endless realms of divinities, mythologies, and variations of the "one" true God. That there are no tenable first principles to be fathomed here beyond those already to be found in the earlier five domains is, of course, a personal judgment which is otherwise too complex to outline and justify in this brief introduction; hence, it will not be attempted at this time.